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This paper aims to analyse the effect of deepening regional integration on the incentive for
factors of production, in particular labour, to spatially relocate. We adopt a general
equilibrium, economic-geography model built on Krugman (1991) allowing for skill
heterogeneity in the manufacturing sector. At a given level of trade costs, due to the
productivity premium associated with the concentration of high-skilled workers in one region,
this type of worker will be more willing to migrate than low-skilled ones. The paper shows
the existence of a range of trade costs for which only high-skilled workers have an incentive
to migrate. Therefore, introducing labour heterogeneity in the basic core-periphery model
enables us to explain one of the most striking features of interregional migration patterns: the
positive self-selection of the migrants.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
It is a matter of record that pronounced regional disparities are very persistent in many EU
countries. The spatial distribution of economic activity is far from uniform and economic
agglomeration can be observed at all geographical levels.
The main focus of a recent strand of research has been the origins of such spatial
inequalities and to investigate the effects of increased regional integration on the degree of
spatial agglomeration. In the basic model of Krugman (1991), the interaction between
interregional labour migration, scale economies, transport costs and a spatially immobile
source of demand generates forces of both agglomeration and dispersion. Since some factors
of production are spatially mobile, when transport costs fall below a critical level,
agglomerative forces become strong enough to give rise to a core-periphery structure.
Therefore, even if regions are a priori identical, due to migration-induced demand linkages,
they can endogenously differentiate into an industrial core and a deindustrialised periphery.
1
It has been argued that while this approach is relevant for studying agglomeration
within national boundaries, in the EU context low rates of migration seem to limit the role of
labour mobility as a driving force for agglomeration. Empirical studies suggests that although
such an adjustment process works through regional migration in the US (Blanchard and Katz
1992), in Europe very little migration across European countries is observed despite large
intercountry wage differences (Decressin and Fatàs 1995). This difference in the adjustment
mechanism between the US and the European labour markets is still remarkable even if we
consider internal migration within European countries.
While the rates of internal and international migration have been very low, several
studies have demonstrated that some groups of individuals are more geographically mobile
                                                  
1 For a survey of the New Economic Geography literature see Fujita et al (1999), Ottaviano and Puga (1998), or
more recently Neary (2000).3
and more reactive to regional wage differentials. In migration literature it is a standard
proposition the fact that economic migrants
2 tend to be, on average, more skilled, young,
educated and entrepreneurial than similar individuals who choose to remain in their place of
origin (positive self-selection of the migrants).
3 A better understanding of the pattern of
migration is important for assessing the economic and sociological consequences for the
origin and destination regions. The more migrants are favourably selected and the more
beneficial will be their impact on the destination economy. On the contrary, the more
positively selected are the migrants the greater, in general, will be the adverse effect on the
region of origin.
4
Modern economies have made an epochal transition from a world where the basic
source of value, productivity and economic growth has been physical labour and manual
skill, to a world of knowledge-intensive capitalism where a fundamental role is played by
intelligence and intellectual labour (human capital). Scientists, engineers and high skilled
workers on the factory floor and in advanced services companies are the sources of
innovations and ideas. The wealth of regions and nations in the 21
st century economies is
largely based on this human infrastructure (Florida, 1995). Consequently, a region with a
more skilled labour force is likely to grow faster than a region with a less skilled labour force.
Migration of high skilled workers may potentially have consequences on the regional
                                                  
2 We refer to economic migrants as individuals who move from one place of work and residence to another,
both within or across countries, on the basis of a decision taken comparing their own economic opportunities in
origin and destination locations. In this way we want to distinguish those migrants from refugees and those
migrating for other reasons.
3 For a review of theoretical and empirical contributions on this topic see Chiswick (2000). Borjas, Bronars and
Trejo (1992) find evidence of self-selection studying internal migration in the U.S. In fact migrants with higher
educational levels appear to be attracted toward regions with higher returns to education.
4 According to some authors (see Mountford 1997, or Stark et al 1997), when migration is not a certainty, the
brain drain may be associated with a brain gain for the source region. The possibility to migrate gives an
incentive to invest in human capital formation. Therefore, higher levels of human capital in the economy could
outweigh the negative effects of the brain drain. While this outcome may, in principle, be realistic when
assessing the effects of North-South migration, it seems to be less appropriate when applied to migration flow
between and within  developed countries.4
economic performance, since it affects the way the regions maintain and sustain human
resources.
The regional level of skills can be interpreted as the stock of human capital in the
economy. According to Lucas (1988) the accumulation of human capital is a source of
positive spillovers. It is reasonable to argue that workers' skills are augmented through
learning and exchange of ideas, and that workers therefore increase their productivity by
interacting with those around them. As a result, migration of a worker from a region where
the average level of human capital is low to one where the average level is high will raise his
productivity. Geographic proximity is crucial since it allows ideas to travel more rapidly, the
impact of such localised externalities weakens with distance. As proposed by Kremer (1993),
many production processes consist of multiple tasks, all of which must be successfully
completed for the product to have a full value. The matching of skilled workers in the
production process increases the probability of successfully performing those tasks. In
equilibrium, skilled workers are matched together in the core region. This assumption is
consistent with a series of stylised facts. First of all, the substantial wage and productivity
differences between rich and poor regions.
This paper aims to analyse the effect of a deepening of a regional integration process
on the incentive for labour to spatially relocate. We adopt a general equilibrium, economic-
geography model similar to Krugman (1991). We allow for skill heterogeneity in the
manufacturing sector. Two types of manufacturing workers exist in our simplified economy:
low and high-skilled, where skills are associated with the efficiency unit of labour offered in
the labour market. We assume that the former is able to supply one unit of labour. High-
skilled workers are potentially more productive than the unskilled ones. Interaction between
high-skilled manufacturing workers in a region (we assume that proximity is needed here)5
increases the productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge diffusion process. In the
model the skill premium is endogenous and increasing in the regional quota of high-skilled
workers.
5
We analyse the migration behaviour of low and high-skilled workers in a process of
regional economic integration. At a given level of trade costs, due to the productivity
premium associated with the high-skilled matching in one region, this type of workers will be
more willing to migrate than low-skilled ones. The results of the paper show the existence of
a range of trade costs for which only high-skilled workers have an incentive to migrate.
Therefore introducing labour heterogeneity in the basic core-periphery model enables us to
explain one of the most striking features of interregional migration patterns: the positive self-
selection of the migrants. Another important implication of the model is the existence of a
persistent wage and productivity differential between the core and peripheral regions, a result
which is supported by a recent strand of empirical literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present recent empirical evidence on
agglomeration and human capital externalities. Section 3 develops the model. In Section 4 we
examine the possible spatial equilibria and their features. Section 5 concludes.
                                                  
5 According to Glaeser (1998), firms choose to locate in cities and pay the higher wages and suffer congestion
costs because workers in cities are more productive: "...if workers weren't more productive firms would leave
cities altogether and hire elsewhere. Since the urban wage premium appears to be a centuries-old phenomenon,
we must assume that over the long run, firms are quite willing to pay these higher wages".6
2.   Agglomeration and Human Capital Externalities: empirical evidence
In our model, the interaction between high-skilled workers in a region increases the
productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge diffusion process. Regions with a
higher average level of human capital are therefore more attractive for high-skilled workers.
The skill premium is endogenous and increasing in the regional quota of high-skilled
workers. One of the implications of the model is the existence of a wage and productivity
differential between the core and peripheral regions.
Economic theory gives several explanations on why nominal wages may be different
across regions in the short run, one of the main reasons being the existence of asymmetrical
regional shocks and, overtime, divergences of regional business cycles. In the long run, after
the necessary adjustments in local labour markets have taken place, regional nominal wages
should, in principle, converge.
One possible explanation for the observed lack of convergence in the long run is
linked to the existence of differences in the regional “endowment” of amenities. Local
amenities, such as good climate, favorable physical morphology of the area, air and water
quality, may affect regional wages through two main channels. First, through a positive (or
negative) effect on consumer utility. For example if consumer values the warm and sunny
weather of Southern Italy, they will require a wage premium to live and work in rainy and
cloudy climate of Northern Italy. As a result, ceteris paribus, we expect workers of similar
characteristics willing to accept lower salaries in region with pleasant weather conditions.
Secondly, local non-exclusive amenities may also have a direct influence on labour
productivity. If the effect is positive we will expect higher wages. The attractiveness of the
area, due to a positive regional wage differential, will induce migration, and therefore these
productivity differences will be capitalised into differentials in land rents.7
The impact of exogenous regional characteristics on the spatial variation in factor
prices is generally evaluated using hedonic price estimation technique (Roback 1982). As
Hanson (2001) points out, although empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that local
amenities contribute to explaining regional differences of factor prices, some evidence shows
that considerable differences remain even within regions with a similar endowment of
exogenous amenities.
Some theories, based on the existence of localized human capital externalities, argue
that differentials in factor remuneration may be persistent over time if regions present a
different level of human capital (see Eaton and Eckstein 1997). The main idea is that the level
of skills, education and experiences of the local labour force positively affect workers’
productivity. Interaction between skilled individual enables flows of ideas, diffusion of best
practice and, in general, the possibility to benefit from a local knowledge stock.  As a
consequence, also high-skilled workers from other areas will be attracted toward regions with
higher returns to skills. Therefore, a positive self-selection of migrants (see Borjas et al.
1992) may generate a self-sustaining mechanism of growth. According to the theory the level
of local human-capital has an important role in explaining spatial differences in wages and
housing prices. Recent empirical studies have supported this prediction using micro data.
Rauch (1993) employs US Census data on wages and human capital of individuals in 237
cities in 1980 to estimate externalities in cities using individual wage-regressions. The notion
of human capital defined by Rauch  contains both education and work experience
components. His results suggest that the external effect of a one-year increase in average
schooling in cities has a positive and statistically significant effect on wages of workers in the
same city of around 4%. These results hold even when he controls for the effects of other
factors such as R&D investment policies that favour cities, as well as university concentration8
in urban areas. More recently, Ciccone and Peri (2000) find that a one-year increase in
average schooling in US cities raises aggregate productivity by 8 to 11%.
6
How then, are externalities transmitted across regions? Is there any evidence that their
effects are weaker over longer distances? Ciccone and Hall (1996) use data at the county
level to see if variations in population density can explain the large discrepancies in
productivity levels across the US.
7 In their analysis, they control for the endogeneity of
employment density to ensure that the correlation between density and productivity that they
find is not merely the result of productive regions growing faster than less productive ones.
They find that doubling employment density increases labour productivity by 6%. Their
results hold even when other factors are taken into account (such as the level of public
capital, the level of education and the influence of market size). According to their analysis,
closer interaction between workers in a geographical unit does have a positive effect on
productivity.
Other indirect evidence supports the argument that the relevance of spatial influence
decay as distance increases. In fact, the geographical distribution of income and
unemployment, both in absolute values and variations over time is strongly correlated across
neighbouring regions (see Overman and Puga, 1999, and Quah, 1996).
3.  THE MODEL
We consider a world economy consisting of two regions (1,2).  There are two sectors:
agriculture and manufacturing. Agriculture is perfectly competitive and produces a
homogeneous good according to a constant-return-to-scale technology. This sector employs
                                                  
6 For a survey on empirical work relating schooling to aggregate labour productivity see de la Fuente and
Domenech (2000). They also estimate the effect of a one-year increase in average schooling on the average
labour productivity for OECD countries, finding evidence of a positive impact by around 4%.9
interregionally immobile farm labourers (sector-specific factor). We assume that the unit
labour requirement is one.
Manufacturing is a monopolistically competitive sector producing a variety of
differentiated products with increasing-return-to-scale technology and employs
interregionally mobile workers. We assume the existence of two types of workers in the
manufacturing sector, which differ only in terms of the level of efficiency unit of labour
supplied.
3.1 Consumers’-workers’ behaviour
All individuals share the same Cobb-Douglas utility function:
1 UM A
µµ − =    (1)
where M is a quantity index of consumption of manufactured goods and A is consumption of
the agricultural good. Therefore µ  is the expenditure share of manufactured goods. The
manufacturing aggregate M, is a sub-utility function of a discrete number of varieties defined
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7 According to the authors, in the U.S. a worker in the most productive state is two-thirds more productive than a
worker in the least productive state.10
where  n is the number of varieties produced, mi consumption of each variety and ρ  a
parameter representing the intensity of the “love for variety” in the manufacturing sector. The
constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is σ  ≡  1/ (1 - ρ ),  (σ  >1).
The consumers maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
1
n
Ai i PA mp Y += ∑
where Y is income and PA,  pi respectively the prices of the homogeneous product and prices
for each variety of the manufacturing aggregate.
A two stage budgeting procedure can be applied. The first step in the consumer’s problem is
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Equation (3) is the compensated demand function for the jth variety.
The minimum cost of attaining a fixed amount of M, can be expressed by using equation (3)
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where the second part of the expression on the right-hand side can be easily interpreted as the










P measures the minimum cost of purchasing a unit of the composite index M, and can be
thought of as an expenditure function.










   (6)12
The second step of the consumer’s problem is to choose the optimal allocation of income
between A and M so that the utility is maximised
Maximising 
1 UM A
µµ − =    subject  to.   PM + PAA=Y , gives us the uncompensated demand
for A and for each variety,  j m :
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From the consumer’s utility maximisation problem we can also express the indirect utility


















µ µ −   can be interpreted as the regional cost-of-living index in the economy.
What is the welfare effect of an increase in the number of variety? Assuming that all varieties
are available at the same price  [] ,1 , . . . , ij ppj n =∀ ∈ , we can rewrite the manufacturing goods
price index as:
1
1 1 1 1
1
n
ii Pp p n
σ σ σ
− − − 
== 
 ∑13
Therefore, an increase in the number of available varieties reduces the manufacturing price
index. Consequently, given that the indirect utility function (9), is decreasing in the
manufacturing price index, the regional welfare increases.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ , determines the responsiveness of the price
index to a change in the available number of varieties.
3.2 Labour supply and human capital externalities
The world farmer’s population employed in the agriculture sector is 1 - µ . Since farmers
cannot regionally relocate, the supply in each region is (1 - µ )/2.
The manufacturing sector employs two types of workers (i) low-skilled workers, and
(ii) high-skilled workers.
 8 Both types of workers are endowed with one unit of labour, and
may move between regions. We assume that the global population of workers of each type is
normalised to 1. The total population of manufacturing workers therefore sums to 2.
The existence of localised human capital externalities implies that the interaction
between high-skilled workers in a region increases the productivity of each skilled worker by
a knowledge diffusion process. The productivity of high-skilled workers, i.e. the efficiency
unit of labour supplied, depends upon the number of workers with similar characteristics in
the regional labour force. In the model the skill premium  i s  is endogenous, and may differ
between regions according to the size of the regional highly skilled population  ( ) ii sf S = ,
where  Si represents the population of high-skilled workers in region i. We formalise the
positive interaction between high-skilled workers in a region as:
() ii sS
λ
=            (10)
                                                  
8 In this model, labour provided by low and high skilled is qualitatively homogeneous. Manufacturing workers
of the two types are perfect substitutes.14
where the parameter λ  measures the strength of human capital externalities. Such
externalities are increasing in the quota of high-skilled workers but at a decreasing rate.
Given  
1 '( ) 0 ii i sS S
λ λ
− ∂∂ = > , and 
2 '' ( 1)( ) 0 ii i sS S
λ λλ
− ∂∂ = − < , it follows that 01 λ << .
The fact that high skilled are more efficient in providing unit of labour according to a skill




ii i ww s =+             (11)
where 
s
i w  and  i w , represent respectively the worker nominal wages of high-skilled and low-
skilled in region i. In this formulation of the model we have no explicit reference to a quality
(vertical) differentiation of the manufacturing sector products.  In a similar work Mori and
Turrini (2000) assume that skilled workers add “quality” to each unit of products. They
consider therefore product differentiation to have both a horizontal dimension (variety), and a
vertical one (quality).
It is useful to distinguish between the world population of manufacturing workers and
the world total supply of effective units of labour. The two measures are not identical since
the geographical distribution of skilled workers (the human capital level in each region) is
going to affect the total number of units of labour supplied. Total units of effective labour in
one region are given by:
1 () iii LU S
λ + =+ (12)15
where  i U and  i S  represent respectively the share of total low and high-skilled workers
population, which live in region i.
It is important to note that the number of skilled workers, as a fraction of the total
manufacturing labour force, is exogenously determined.
9
3.3 Production technology
Agriculture is a constant return to scale, perfectly competitive sector. We normalise the
unitary labour input requirement to 1. Agricultural products are freely traded and therefore
agricultural prices and wages are equalised across regions and shall be our numeraire.
Consequently, 1 AA Pw ==  in both regions.
The production of any variety of the manufactured good involves a fixed and a
constant marginal cost:
ii lx α β =+  (13)
where  i x  is the quantity produced and li the labour requirement for its production. Because of
economies of scale at firm level and consumers’ preferences for variety, firms produce a
single product facing an elasticity of demand equal to σ .
Imported manufacturing varieties incur Samuelson iceberg trade costs. If a variety is shipped
from one region to the other, part of each unit melts away during the transport, therefore only
a fraction 1/τ  arrives at destination.
10  The introduction of this kind of trade costs implies that,
if a variety is produced in region 1, consumers in the two different regions have to pay
                                                  
9 In subsequent research, we consider the worker’s human capital investment decision and the role of public
policy.16
different prices. A manufacturing good produced in region 1 costs the F.O.B. price pi  for a
home consumer, while the consumers in region 2 pay the C.I.F. price ( i p τ ).
11
As a consequence, according to the number of variety produced in each region, the
manufacturing price index P may assume different values between regions:
1
1 1 1
11 1 2 2
1
1 1 1
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3.4 Size of the regional manufacturing industry
Production technology is the same for each variety in both locations. Manufacturing labour is
the only input.  We continue to assume perfect substitubility in the production function
between low-skilled and high-skilled workers.  A firm producing a specific variety at region
i, faces a wage rate wi for each unit of labour, which consequently represent the low-skilled
nominal wage.
 12
Given the following profit equation:
() ii i i i px x w πα β =− +  (15)
the profit-maximising  behaviour of  a firm located in region i is a constant mark-up over the
regional wage rate:
                                                                                                                                                             
10  1 τ≥  represents the amount of the goods dispatched per unit received at destination.
11 F.O.B. and C.I.F. are commercial clauses frequently used in international transaction meaning respectively
Free On Board and Cost Insurance and Freight.
12 In this way we are able to preserve the features of Dixit-Stiglitz framework (in particular, the number of
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the associated equilibrium labour input is also constant and given by:
()
* 1 ii lx α β αα σα σ =+ =+ −=  (19)











                                                  
13 Since each variety is produced in one location by a single firm, ni represents both the number of varieties and
the number of firms in region i.18
An increase in the regional size works through changes in the variety of goods (firms)
available, leaving inalterated both mark-up over marginal cost and the scale of individual
production. The equilibrium number of firms is therefore proportional to the region’s






3.5 Equilibrium conditions in goods and labour markets
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After some manipulation, using the pricing rule equation, we obtain the following
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 (23)19
We choose the following normalisation
14 in order to simplify the wage equation and












From the pricing rule equation we get:  ii pw =  and  ii nL = . It is possible to rewrite
the price index as:
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−− ==  (remember  1 σ > ). The parameter φ  which is a function of the trade
costs can be interpreted as a parameter reflecting freeness of trade, ranging in between zero
for very high trade costs when τ→∞ (autarky), and one in the case of no trade costs, i.e.
1 τ= .
                                                  
14 The scope of these normalisations, widely used in this literature, is to shift the analysis to the number of
manufacturing workers and their wages in each region in order to study the equilibria in the model and their
stability.20
The price index equations (25) as noted before have an important property.  The regional
manufacturing price index will tend to be lower, the higher is the share of effective
manufacturing labour in the region, since more varieties are produced locally without
incurring therefore in transport costs (price-index effect).
The total regional income Yi is given by the sum of all farmers and workers wages
11 1
22 2
(1 ) / 2








where 1-µ   is the world population of immobile farmers.





. As the agriculture product is the numeraire, the index can be simplified to  i P
µ .
We assume that workers are paid linearly according to their level of skill sI; consequently the
real wages, ( ,
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The economy is assumed to reach instantaneously a short-run equilibrium for any given
allocation of workers between regions. The solution of the set of equations (25)-(27)
determines  w1 and w2 for which (i) consumers maximise utility (ii) profits are both
maximised and driven to zero by free entry (iii) all markets clear.
4.   SPATIAL EQUILIBRIA
In the long-run, in the absence of migration costs, real wage differentials are the only
determinant in the decision of low and high-skilled workers to move from one region to the
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where  χ  is a function increasing  in ω
u and ω
s, which represent the regional real wage
differentials for low- and high-skilled workers. Regional migration flows to region 1 are
positive if workers enjoy a higher level of utility (i.e. higher real wages) by moving in this
region.
We would like to determine when the long-run equilibrium will exhibit regional
convergence (symmetric equilibrium), and when it will lead to a core-periphery structure
with all workers and manufacturing sector concentrated in one region. In addition, we are
interested in determining whether, in the long-run, the migration pattern will exhibit the
feature of favourable self-selection of the migrants. To answer these questions we have to
consider the local stability of these equilibria. Let consider the case where the world economy22
is at the symmetric equilibrium. It is easy to see that if labour allocation between regions is
identical, that is  12 1 2 1/2 SSUU ==== , the nominal wages are the same in the two regions,
w1=w2. Assume now that as a consequence of a shock to the symmetric equilibrium  12 LL > ,
that is some workers are allocated from region 2 to region 1. If this change in stocks
positively affects real wage in region 1 relative to region 2, it will encourage migration as
initial symmetric equilibrium is unstable. The opposite is true if the real wage differential
becomes negative.
The initial movement of a single worker has four effects.
 15
The first is the price-index effect, working in favour of divergence. As mentioned
above, the cost of living will be lower in the country with the larger manufacturing sector,
because a smaller proportion of trade costs will be paid for by the same bundle of
manufactured goods.
A second agglomerative force, the home-market effect, reinforces this effect. From
(26), nominal wages in a region will tend to be higher if income in the region is high. The
reason is that firms can afford to pay higher wages if they have good access to a larger market
As a consequence, the large market retains a more than proportional share of manufacturing
sector. The idea is not a new one but finds its root in the literature on market potential (see
Harris, 1954).
Third is the competition effect. The presence of more firms in the local market will
increase competition to serve the regional immobile consumers thus tending to reduce local
profits and so encouraging the stability of the symmetric outcome.
Finally, the migration of a skilled worker has a positive effect on the productivity of
skilled workers in the host region, and therefore a positive effect on their nominal wages. We
call  this last effect which is peculiar to high-skilled workers migration, skill premium effect.23
The stability of the symmetric equilibrium is given by the relative strength of these
agglomerative and dispersive forces at work. For sufficiently high trade costs, imported
manufactured varieties are so expensive that it is profitable to have a symmetric equilibrium.
Conversely, at low trade costs the symmetric equilibrium is always unstable. Regional
economic integration has no impact on the location of industry until a critical level of
freeness of trade is reached. When this threshold of freeness of trade, the φ -break, is reached
the symmetric outcome becomes unstable since workers have an incentive to migrate. The
skill premium effect is peculiar to high-skilled workers, therefore the incentive to migrate and
the relative φ -break will be higher for this type of workers.
Formally a stable equilibrium is any point where:
(i)  the regional wage differentials are zero and { / , / , / , / }
uu s s
iii i USSU ωω ω ω ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂
are all strictly negative. This is the case of a stable symmetric equilibrium where
1/2; ii SU i == ∀ ∈ {1,2}. A positive increase in the quota of low or high-skilled workers in
the region, negatively affects the real wage differential. Agglomerative forces are dominated
by dispersive forces, therefore as a consequence counter-migration of manufacturing workers
will re-equilibrate the size of the regional manufacturing labour force;
(ii)  0, 0
us ωω >>  and S = U = 1 (or vice versa  0, 0
us ωω <<  and S = U = 0), in the
case of a core-periphery equilibrium. The entire population of low and high-skilled workers
will be concentrated in the core. In this case we have the condition that in the core region
{/ ,/ ,/ ,/ }
uu s s
iii i USSU ωω ω ω ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂  are all strictly positive.
(iii)  0, 0
us ωω =>  with  i S = 1 and  i U = 0 when a positive self-selection equilibrium is a
stable outcome.  In this case high-skilled workers will be concentrated in the core region,
                                                                                                                                                             
15 This adjustment mechanism assumes that entry and exit of firms occurs infinitely faster than migration. Firms
are therefore always in equilibrium.24
while a symmetric equilibrium is still stable for the unskilled workers
({ / , / }
uu
ii US ωω ∂∂ ∂∂ should be strictly negative).
In Figures 1 and 2
16 we plot respectively the low and high-skilled workers real wages
in region 1
17 at different levels of trade costs. This allows us to analyse how the integration
process, measured by the level of trade costs, will affect the equilibrium size of the
manufacturing sector and the average level of human capital in the regions. We report the real
wage differential for low and high-skilled workers as a function of the share of only one type
of manufacturing labour keeping the other at the symmetric equilibrium. In this way we
assess, for each type of worker, how the real wage differential reacts as a consequence of
variations of both types of manufacturing workers population. Specifically, diagrams (a) [(b)]
of both figures report the real wage differentials as a function of the share of low-skilled
[high-skilled] workers in region 1, given that high-skilled [low-skilled] workers are equally
distributed between the two regions,  1/2 S =  [ 1/2 U = ].
For high trade costs (φ = 0.05, or τ  = 2.714) the symmetric equilibrium is stable since
the cost of supplying a market by exporting is too large. Both low and high-skilled have no
incentive to migrate in region 2. When a worker migrates (either high or low-skilled), the
host region becomes less attractive than the destination one. In the long-run the economy
converges to a symmetric equilibrium in which manufacturing is equally divided.
As the economy becomes slightly more integrated (φ = 0.05, or τ  = 2.487), the
symmetric equilibrium is no longer stable for both type of workers. Consider the low-skilled
first. From Fig. 1 it is evident that an increase in the share of both low and high-skilled
                                                  
16 The model cannot be solved analytically. In the paper, all the figures presented are derived by numerical
simulations. The values of the parameters are similar to those used in related papers. We let µ  = 0.3, while σ  =
4; mark-up estimates are normally between 20-30%, which correspond an elasticity of substitution σ  between 6
and 4. Agglomerative externalities are chosen on the basis of the empirical evidence mentioned in the
conclusions,  δ = 0.1. Analytical expressions for φ
u , φ
s break and φ  self-selection, have been derived using a
procedure first introduced by Puga (1999) to which we refer. Maple files containing the simulation procedure
and the stability analysis are available from the author on request.25
workers has a negative effect on the real wage differential (the schedule is downward-sloping
for both U and S). The competition effect is in this case stronger than the effect of the other
two agglomerative forces. For the high-skilled worker the situation is different (Fig. 2) If the
skilled manufacturing labour force concentrates in one region, these workers become more
productive and the competition effect is more than compensated by the skill premium effect.
However, migration of the low-skilled has a negative impact on the high-skilled real wage.
Finally, at low trade costs ( 0.60 φ= , or τ  = 1.1856), the symmetric equilibrium
becomes unstable and a core-periphery structure arises.
Fig. 3 shows how the types of equilibria are related with trade costs. The shares of
manufacturing labour force in region 1, U and S, are measured on the vertical axis. Solid and
dotted lines represent respectively stable and unstable equilibria. At high trade costs, there is
a unique stable equilibrium in which skilled and unskilled workers are equally divided
between the two regions.
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Since the two regions are perfectly symmetric we restrict the following analysis to region 1.26
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When trade barriers fall below a critical level (φ
s sustain) a core-periphery
equilibrium for the high-skilled becomes possible. However, the symmetric equilibrium is
still stable for values above another critical value (φ
s break).
18 As the regional economies
become more integrated high-skilled workers will migrate first in response to real wage
differentials.
We next consider whether there is a range of transport costs for which only the high-
skilled migrate to the core region. We compute a critical level of trade costs for which U = ½
and S = 1 (or zero) is a stable equilibrium,  φ -self selection. For trade costs below these level
a core-periphery equilibrium as in Krugman (1991) is the only stable outcome. The stability
of the symmetric equilibrium for the low-skilled is affect by high-skilled workers’ migration.
The concentration of high-skilled workers in the core region will strengthen the
agglomerative forces since more varieties are produced (price-index effect) and more income
will be generated in this region (home-market effect). For sufficiently high trade costs, the
symmetric equilibrium for the low-skilled may still be stable. But as regional integration
proceeds, the stability may be reversed. A two-stage process of industry location may arise.
First, the core region (which is still relatively small) is attractive only to workers in the skill
intensive industry. Concentration of skilled workers increases productivity and firms are
willing to pay higher nominal wages. Second, as a threshold of trade costs is reached, φ -self
selection, high-skilled workers’ concentration in the core region, also induces low-skilled
workers to migrate leaving the periphery deindustrialised (the home-market and price-index
effects become stronger than the competition effect).
                                                  
18 For values of trade costs within the range (φ
s break < φ
s < φ
s sustain), both concentration of the high skilled in
one of the two regions and symmetry are possible equilibria. The model does not predict which equilibria will
arise; policy and history have clearly a potential role in determining the outcome.29
From fig. 3 the following relations are evident:
φ
u break < φ  self-selection < φ
u  sustain <φ
s break < φ
s sustain
there exist therefore a range of trade costs for which a self-selecting equilibrium is possible (φ
self-selection < φ   < φ
s sustain)  and another smaller range for which is the only stable
equilibrium (φ
u  sustain <  φ   < φ
s break).
The critical values considered depend on the parameters of the model. All the threshold
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Trade costs and stability of the spatial equilibria30
agglomerative forces will be stronger for two reasons. First, the manufactured products will
have a bigger share in the bundle of consumption of a representative individual so the  price-
index effect becomes more important. Second, he share of manufactures in world income will
be larger and therefore strengthens the backward linkage effect.
Critical values are decreasing in σ , the elasticity of substitution in demand. The range of
trade costs in which the core-periphery equilibrium occurs is greater the smaller is the
elasticity of substitution between varieties. Lower σ  implies that consumers view different
varieties as being more distinctive, increasing their love of variety. The result is an
equilibrium with more varieties and a lower output of each. By decreasing σ , the magnitude
of scale economies, one of the agglomerative forces in the model is reduced. Finally an
increase in the strength of the positive externalities between high-skilled worker, λ , makes
agglomeration possible at higher level of trade costs.
5.  CONCLUSION
This paper uses a version of the core-periphery model of trade and location by Krugman
(1991) to analyse the migration behaviour of workers with different skills in a process of
regional economic integration. Introducing labour heterogeneity in the basic core-periphery
model enables us to explain one of the most striking features of interregional migration
patterns, the positive self-selection of migrants.
In our model, the interaction between high-skilled workers in a region increases the
productivity of each worker by means of a knowledge diffusion process. Regions with a
higher average level of human capital are therefore more attractive for high-skilled workers.
The skill premium is endogenous and increasing in the regional quota of high-skilled
workers.31
We find that there exists therefore a range of trade costs for which a self-selecting
equilibrium is possible and another smaller range for which is the only stable equilibrium.
One of the results of the model is the existence of a wage and productivity differential
between the core and peripheral regions. Recent empirical works have supported this
prediction using micro data.
The paper presented is highly stylised. In particular, the existence of congestion costs
in the core region as in Helpman (1995), or an imperfectly mobile labour force across regions
as modelled by Ludema and Wooton
19 (1997), can prevent the model from having an
unrealistic catastrophic agglomeration at low transport costs (especially in the EU context). It
is not intention of this paper discount these factors. The aim is to emphasise that the
mechanisms highlighted in the paper may play an important role in the debate concerning the
adequacy of regional cohesion policies at both national and European levels.
                                                  
19 They assume that workers have preferences for living in a particular location. The labour supply is not
perfectly elastic as assumed in our model but the labour supply schedule is upward-sloping. The authors obtain a
U-shaped relationship between manufacturing  location and trade liberalization.32
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